Cause & Consequence
- Failure of vessels or pipework
Specific Incident Equipment
2" Bore dead leg close to the test separator.
- Concerns were raised because we could not see from the events summary that all ESDVS, wing valves and other ESD equipment had operated as expected.
- It was clear after the event that the indication status for critical valves was poor and a known issue but nothing had been done formalle about this; Thus it was reliant on the CRO being aware of the plant status. This was not always obvious.
- Investigate why a safety critical element was out of commission without an appropriate ORA and act on the identified rooy causes
- Investigate why both ESDV's had been tested and recorded as failed but had not been adequately reparied or replaced and act on the identified rooy causes
- Identify the cause of failure of the two ESDV's (ESV 30011-1 & ESV 30011-2) and take appropriate action
- Review inspection details, corrosion risk assessment and other data relevant to the management of corrosion of this line. Take appropiate action based on this review
- Complete the dead lef register and put a programme in place for the management of dead leg integrity
- Determine whether the loss of fluids to both the test separator and the leak are in line with the inventory from the wells (to the known closed in points)
- Review criticality of all manual operational valves and key isolation valves to form the basis of a cost/risk reduction benefit analysis to identify priorities for change-out